Concert/C: A language for distributed programming

Concert/C is a new language for distributed C programming that extends ANSI C to support distribution and process dynamics. Concert/C provides the ability to create and terminate processes, connect them together, and communicate among them. It supports transparent remote function calls (RPC) and asynchronous messages. Interprocess communications interfaces are typed in Concert/C, and type correctness is checked at compile time wherever possible, otherwise at runtime. All C data types, including complex data structures containing pointers and aliases, can be transmitted in RPCs. Concert/C programs run on a heterogeneous set of machine architectures and operating systems and communicate over multiple RPC and messaging protocols. The current Concert/C implementation runs on AIX 3.2 1, SunOS 4.1, Solaris 2.2 and OS/2 2.1, and communicates over Sun RPC, OSF/DCE and UDP multicast. Several groups inside and outside IBM are actively using Concert/C, and it is available via anonymous ftp from software.watson.ibm.com:/pub/concert.

Efficient Rijndael Encryption Implementation with Composite Field Arithmetic

Abstract. We explore the use of subfield arithmetic for efficient imple-mentations of Galois Field arithmetic especially in the context of the Rijndael block cipher. Our technique involves mapping field elements to a composite field representation. We describe how to select a represen-tation which minimizes the computation cost of the relevant arithmetic, taking into account the cost of the mapping as well. Our method results in a very compact and fast gate circuit for Rijndael encryption. In conjunction with bit-slicing techniques applied to newly proposed par-allelizable modes of operation, our circuit leads to a high-performance software implementation for Rijndael encryption which offers significant speedup compared to previously reported implementations

EMpowering Side-Channel Attacks

In this paper, we report preliminary results obtained as a result of a systemati

Effect of Prior Gamma Irradiation on Thermal Decomposition, Ignition and Combustion of Coal

The effect of prior gamma irradiation on the thermal decomposition, ignition and combustion of coal has been studied using thermogravimetry, differential thermal analysis and isothermal techniques. Data indicate that for high ash containing coals the thermal decomposition is drastically catalysed, the ignition temperature is lowered very significantly and the flame duration is increased by gamma irradiation

Towards sound approaches to counteract power-analysis attacks

Abstract. Side channel cryptanalysis techniques, such as the analysis of instantaneous power consumption, have been extremely e ective in attacking implementations on simple hardware platforms. There are several proposed solutions to resist these attacks, most of which are ad{hoc and can easily be rendered ine ective. A scienti c approach is to create a model for the physical characteristics of the device, and then design implementations provably secure in that model, i.e, they resist generic attacks with an a priori bound on the number of experiments. We propose an abstract model which approximates power consumption in most devices and in particular small single{chip devices. Using this, we propose a generic technique to create provably resistant implementations for devices where the power model has reasonable properties, and a source of randomness exists. We prove alower bound on the number of experiments required to mount statistical attacks on devices whose physical characteristics satisfy reasonable properties.

A Cautionary Note Regarding Evaluation of AES Candidates on Smart-Cards

NIST has considered the performance of AES candidates on smart-cards as an important selection criterion and many submitters have highlighted the compactness and efficiency of their submission on low end smart cards. However, in light of recently discovered power based attacks, we strongly argue that evaluating smart-card suitability of AES candidates requires a very cautious approach. We demonstrate that straightforward implementations of AES candidates on smart cards, are highly vulnerable to power analysis and readily leak away all secret keys. To illustrate our point, we describe a power based attack on the Twofish Reference 6805 code which we implemented on a ST16 smart card. The attack required power samples from only 100 independent block encryptions to fully recover the 128-bit secret key. We also describe how all other AES candidates are susceptible to similar attacks. We review the basis of power attacks and suggest countermeasures for a secure implementation. Unf..